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THE DSM-5 AND CRIMINAL DEFENSE: WHEN DOES A DIAGNOSIS 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
 
Nancy Haydt* 
 
Abstract 
 
In June 2013, the American Psychiatric Association published the 
Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(“DSM-5”). The DSM-5 was intended to be an updated guidebook for the 
clinical diagnosis of mental disorders. It received mixed reviews from the 
mental health community.1 The reception from the forensic mental health 
community is likewise varied. The evolution of conceptualizing mental 
illness, its origins and treatment efficacy, may weaken the authority of the 
DSM and further confuse its application in forensic situations.2 This 
Article explores the possible effects of the DSM-5 in criminal cases. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Like its predecessors, the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders’ (“DSM-5”)3 diagnostic criteria is “primarily designed to assist 
clinicians in conducting clinical assessment, case formulation, and treatment 
planning.”4 However, courts and attorneys widely use the DSM-5 as a primary 
reference in assessing the nature and forensic implications of mental disorders. The 
American Psychiatric Association warns: “[I]t is important to note that the definition 
of mental disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians, 
                                                     
* © 2015 Nancy Haydt. Nancy Haydt is a criminal defense attorney, and she is a 
member of the state and federal bars in Colorado and California. Her practice is focused on 
the defense of those charged with capital crimes who have intellectual disabilities and mental 
disorders. Her original empirical research into Atkins cases has revealed trends in intellectual 
disability litigation in California and nationwide. 
1 Thomas Insel, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, described the DSM-
5 as follows: “While DSM has been described as a ‘Bible’ for the field, it is, at best, a 
dictionary, creating a set of labels and defining each.” Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog: 
Transforming Diagnosis, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transforming-diagnosis.shtml, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TV9R-ZDCK.  
2 See id. (“We need to begin collecting the genetic, imaging, physiologic, and cognitive 
data to see how all the data—not just the symptoms—cluster and how these clusters relate to 
treatment response. That is why NIMH will be re-orienting its research away from DSM 
categories.”). 
3AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5]. 
4 Id. at 25. 
848 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
public health professionals, and research investigators rather than all of the 
technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.”5 
Using the DSM-5 in forensic settings has both “risks and limitations.”6 “DSM 
diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any 
objective laboratory measure.”7 There is therefore a high likelihood of mismatch 
between the information available for forensic analysis and the symptomology, 
which would be the basis for a clinical diagnosis. Diagnostic criteria and reports of 
defendants’ behaviors are also often misused or misrepresented in forensic 
applications.8 While it is clear that legal determinations involving mental disorders 
should be informed by clinical practice,9 there is no requirement that any jurisdiction 
adopt verbatim DSM-5 language, terminology, or diagnostic practices.10 
In addition, the law has long been skeptical about psychiatry and 
unaccommodating to the evolution of diagnosis and classification of mental 
disorders. Unlike other areas of science,11 courts are mistrustful of professional 
diagnoses of mental disorders12 and treat forensic mental health professionals as 
“hired guns”13 or “professional elitists.”14 Making matters worse, relatively few trial 
attorneys understand how to establish the evidentiary foundation for mental health 
                                                     
5 Id. (emphasis added). 
6 Id. 
7 See Insel, supra note 1. 
8 See generally id. (noting “that symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of 
treatment” for patients with mental disorders).  
9 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014) (holding that Florida’s definition of 
Intellectual Disability was unconstitutionally narrow and that a determination of Intellectual 
Disability must take into consideration prevailing medical practice). 
10 See id. at 1998 (stating that “the States play a critical role in advancing protections 
and providing the Court with information that contributes to an understanding of how 
intellectual disability should be measured and assessed”). 
11 There is a stark dichotomy between the evidentiary treatment of mental health 
testimony and the treatment of all other scientific evidence. Expert opinion is readily 
accepted as fact in cases involving DNA, accident reconstruction, ballistics, and economic 
damages, for example. And many courts readily accept as fact expert testimony about 
pseudosciences like fingerprint, lie detector, or eyewitness identification techniques, which, 
if newly introduced, would not pass scrutiny under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
12 See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (“The only certain thing 
that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease 
is that science has not reached finality of judgment . . . .”). 
13 The Federal Judicial Center surveyed trial judges regarding problems with expert 
testimony. “The most frequent problem cited by judges . . . was experts who ‘abandon 
objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired them.’” MOLLY TREADWAY 
JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 5 (2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
ExpTesti.pdf/$file/ExpTesti.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PFH5-GPMQ. 
14 See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s 
reliance on “the evolving standards of professional societies, most notably the American 
Psychiatric Association” (emphasis omitted)); infra note 17. 
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testimony. Fewer still are able to competently challenge the basis for and substance 
of mental health experts’ testimony.15 
From a conceptual perspective, many consider science and medicine to be 
matters of fact, and consider law to be a matter of societal values. Diagnoses of 
mental disorders are often viewed askance due to this fact/value schism.16 Many 
view mental disorders with disdain, including judges and attorneys, who view 
mental illness to be the result of weakness, moral laxity, cunning, and self-interest.17 
Many believe that mental illness can easily be feigned.18 Treatment regimen and the 
efficacy of mental health treatment are familiar to few outside the realm of 
psychiatry. Many in the field of forensic mental health, particularly expert witnesses 
who do not have an ongoing clinical practice, are confused themselves. The 
evolution in the understanding of mental illness naturally creates conflicting 
literature, which may further obscure the value and validity of informed mental 
health assessment.19 
Going forward, Part II of this Article discusses the legal and scientific 
foundation of mental health experts’ testimony. Part III describes common criminal 
law applications for mental health testimony and the relationship of the DSM-5 to 
these proceedings. Part IV explains the application of the diagnostic framework of 
the DSM-5 in cases where defendants claim protection from execution due to 
intellectual disability. 
                                                     
15 Possibly the most comprehensive reference for legal foundations of mental health 
evidence is Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony, by Dr. Jay Ziskin. The 
title alone conveys the sentiment that dealing with psychiatric and psychological testimony 
is a more arduous task than dealing with other forms of scientific evidence. See DAVID 
FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 5 (6th ed. 2012) 
(building upon the foundational works of Jay Ziskin). 
16 See generally Bruce G. Link et al., Measuring Mental Illness Stigma, 30 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 511 (2004) (discussing the conceptualization and measurement of 
stigma arising from mental illnesses). 
17 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 244 
(2000); Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, 
and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 3, 15 (1999). Justice Alito suggests that the general public has experience and training 
in mental disorders: “Under our modern Eighth Amendment cases, what counts are our 
society’s standards—which is to say, the standards of the American people—not the 
standards of professional associations, which at best represent the views of a small 
professional elite.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2005 (Alito J., dissenting). 
18 Contrary to common belief, mental disorders are not easy to fake, especially when 
the deception must be sustained over a period of time. See Phillip J. Resnick, Malingering, 
in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 543, 544 (Richard Rosner ed., 2d 
ed. 2003); Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The Insanity 
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1404 (1997). 
19 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 776 (2006) (“Evidence of mental disease, then, can 
easily mislead . . . . [O]pinions about mental disease may confuse a jury into thinking the 
opinions show more than they do.”).  
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II.  FOUNDATION 
 
A.  Mental Health Experts and the Basis of Their Testimony 
 
Professional mental health organizations have published ethical codes and 
practice guidelines relevant to forensic testimony,20 but there is no assurance that 
these guidelines or recommended diagnostic procedures will be followed in criminal 
proceedings. Forensic mental health experts include psychiatrists, psychologists, 
neurologists, social workers, and counselors.21 Mental health experts vary greatly in 
clinical experience and training. Postgraduate programs in forensic psychology and 
forensic psychiatry train mental health professionals to assess clients for legal 
purposes; however, a certificate in forensics does not guarantee actual training or 
clinical experience in diagnosis of any specific mental disorder.22 Courts have 
generally taken a “one-size-fits-all” approach for qualifying witnesses as mental 
health experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and equivalent state statutes.23 
The result is that witnesses may be qualified as mental health experts who have little 
or no expertise with the clinical condition at issue24: 
 
                                                     
20 E.g., THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 3 (Edward A. Polloway 
ed., 2015). This book was recently published as a guide for clinicians and forensic mental 
health experts in capital cases where defendants claim Eighth Amendment protection from 
execution. 
21 George W. Woods et al., Neurobehavioral Assessment in Forensic Practice, 35 INT’L 
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 432, 433 (2012). 
22 For example, In re Robert Lewis Jr. is a California capital habeas corpus case where 
the petitioner claimed protection from execution because of his intellectual disability. 
Referee’s Report at 1, In re Robert Lewis Jr., No. A027897 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2012). 
The prosecution “expert” testified that his only experience working with patients with 
intellectual disability was a brief period in graduate school where he was a case manager in 
a facility for individuals with varied mental health problems. Reporter’s Transcript of 
Proceedings at 1971–72, In re Robert Lewis Jr., No. S117235 (Cal. June 24, 2011). The 
“expert” testified that he never administered standardized intelligence tests for the purpose 
of identifying intellectual disability. Id. at 1972–73. However, he was found qualified to 
testify as a forensic expert simply because he had “written hundreds of articles on different 
things” and had testified in other cases involving mental health. Id. at 1965–67.  
23 Per Federal Rule of Evidence 702, to qualify as an expert, a witness must establish 
his expertise by reference to “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” FED. R. 
EVID. 702. However, this requirement has always been treated liberally. In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 1990); cf. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory 
committee’s note (“[T]he expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified 
by ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.’”). 
24 Sophisticated understanding and the application of the best available mental health 
science cannot be assumed from simply holding a mental health credential. J. Gregory Olley, 
Knowledge and Experience Required for Experts in Atkins Cases, 16 APPLIED 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 135, 135–36 (2009). 
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To qualify as [a mental health] expert, the witness generally need not have 
any particular degree or type of experience or training; rather, courts 
consider the totality of the witness’s education, training, and experience in 
the relevant field. Indeed, the qualifications requirement has been viewed 
as “minimal,” and courts frequently hold that criticisms of or deficiencies 
in a witness’s qualifications are matters for cross-examination at trial, 
affecting only the weight, not the admissibility, of the expert’s testimony.25 
 
Diagnosis for legal purposes can be based on physical examination, structured 
interviews,26 psychological and neuropsychological tests, imaging studies, 
laboratory tests, and previous medical and mental health records. Depending on the 
legal issue, an assessment may be retrospective, contemporaneous, or prospective. 
In the context of criminal cases, retrospective assessment is necessary to determine 
state of mind at the time of a crime, competency to waive legal rights,27 
postconviction competency to stand trial, and intellectual disability. 
Contemporaneous assessment is necessary to establish competence to stand trial or 
enter a plea,28 to waive counsel, or to be executed.29 Prospective assessments are 
speculative assessments conducted to determine setting bail and the likelihood of 
success or failure in rehabilitation, the required level of supervision, and the 
likelihood of being dangerous in the future as justification for a more punitive 
sentence. 
For retrospective mental health assessment, careful review of prior medical, 
social, educational, employment, law enforcement, and social service records is 
essential for a competent and comprehensive assessment.30 These records are also 
necessary for competent contemporaneous assessment, and recent medical and 
physical records, including laboratory test results, inform the assessment process.31 
Regardless of its forensic aspiration, current standards in diagnostic procedure may 
require a thorough neuropsychological assessment and neurobehavioral assessment 
of cognitive function.32 A reliable diagnosis requires that an expert have education, 
                                                     
25 FAUST, supra note 15, at 31–32 (citations omitted). 
26 Ethics guidelines in psychology warn that psychologists should avoid giving written 
or oral evidence about the psychological characteristics of a client when the expert has not 
conducted a personal examination. Comm. on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 663 (1991). 
27 I. Bruce Frumkin & Alfredo Garcia, Psychological Evaluations and the Competency 
to Waive Miranda Rights, 27 CHAMPION 12, 13 (2003).  
28 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (stating the Due Process Clause bars trial 
of a person who is mentally incompetent); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 
(1960) (per curiam) (establishing the standard for competence to stand trial). 
29 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417–18 (1986) (plurality opinion) (upholding the 
common law bar against executing the insane). 
30 See Woods et al., supra note 21, at 433 (stating the importance of a comprehensive 
social history in the diagnosis process relevant to the criminal or civil case). 
31 Id. at 436–37. 
32 Id. at 434–37. 
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training, and experience in selecting appropriate diagnostic procedures and 
interpreting the results. 
 
B.  Reliability of Experts’ Diagnoses of Mental Disorders 
 
An expert witness may testify about scientific evidence that is beyond the 
common understanding of a layperson.33 Mental health experts may testify as to 
what scientific information they offer will be helpful and may assist the trier of fact 
in understanding and evaluating scientific evidence.34 Evidence is only admissible 
if it is relevant,35 and evidence is relevant only if it is reliable.36 
The reliability of a mental health expert’s diagnosis refers to the extent to which 
two or more examiners would arrive at the same diagnosis.37 Differences in experts’ 
focus, bias, and technique can account for inconsistent diagnoses.38 Also, an expert’s 
motivation may result in confirmatory bias, which influences the reliability of the 
expert’s mental health assessment.39 Confirmatory bias refers to a tendency to look 
for evidence that supports a preconceived diagnosis or finding based on historical 
information, and to ignore later relevant information because the expert is 
preoccupied with confirming her initial diagnosis.40 Pressure to form a particular 
diagnosis may be inherent in the forensic referral process. For example, a defense 
attorney may refer his client for forensic evaluation, saying, “This guy was clearly 
insane at the time of the offense, but tell me what you honestly think.” Or a 
prosecutor may retain an expert to rule out the presence of intellectual disability, 
instructing, “This guy has low IQ scores but we know he’s been malingering on IQ 
tests for years.”  
The DSM-5 lists twenty-two categories of mental disorders.41 With nine 
hundred pages of diagnostic material, it warns “this set of categorical diagnoses does 
not fully describe the full range of mental disorders that individuals experience and 
present to clinicians on a daily basis throughout the world.”42 Indeed, diagnoses may 
have overlapping symptoms and similar presentations. And it is unlikely that 
                                                     
33 FED. R. EVID. 701–02. 
34 FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
35 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
36 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (stating that “the 
requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a 
standard of evidentiary reliability”). 
37 GARY GROTH-MARNAT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 70 (5th ed. 
2009). 
38 As Professor Faust points out, experts may base their conclusions on methods for 
which there is no research or where the scientific evidence is mixed. FAUST, supra note 15, 
at 7 (“[T]here seem to be almost infinite ways in which experts may alter, distort, mangle, or 
even flat-out disregard prescribed methodologies.”). 
39 Id. at 305. 
40 Id. 
41 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 27. 
42 Id. at 19. 
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complex circumstances associated with criminal behavior are fairly represented in 
the diagnostic criteria. Thus, the likelihood of diagnosis agreement among mental 
health experts is low.  
To understand the degree of diagnostic agreement among adversarial mental 
health experts, Professors Matthew Large and Olav Nielssen studied experts’ reports 
in sixty-seven personal injury cases where there were opposing experts.43 
                                                     
43 Matthew M. Large & Olav Nielssen, Factors Associated with Agreement Between 
Experts in Evidence About Psychiatric Injury, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 515, 516–17 
(2008). 
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Table 1.  Summary of the Large/Nielssen Study44
  
The Large/Nielssen study demonstrates that skepticism about forensic mental 
health diagnoses is justified. There is poor agreement about both the presence of any 
given mental disorder and all specific psychiatric diagnoses in reports written by 
experts from opposing parties. Experts from the same parties had a greater degree 
                                                     
44 Id. at 515–20. 
In a study of sixty-seven personal injury cases following motor vehicle 
accidents, reports were written by psychiatrists or psychologists retained either by 
the plaintiff or defendant. Inter-rater agreement was measured by a ƙ (or kappa) 
statistic in the range of 0 to 1. A ƙ value of 0 indicated a level of agreement that 
may be expected by chance. A ƙ value of 1 indicated expert agreement in all cases. 
The level of agreement was scaled as follows: 
 
 0 to 0.2, poor agreement;  
 0.2 to 0.4, fair agreement;  
 0.4 to 0.6, moderate agreement;  
 0.6 to 0.8, good agreement; and  
 0.8 to 1.0, very good agreement. 
 
Of the sixty-seven cases, forty-two had reports from two mental health 
experts, sixteen from three experts; eight from four experts; and one from five 
experts, for a total of 169 reports. Psychiatrists provided 119 reports; psychologists 
provided fifty. Fifty-six reports were from plaintiff’s experts. Sixty-eight were 
from defendant’s experts; forty-five were from treating psychologists or 
psychiatrists. There were 148 possible pairings of reports. 
The study found: 
 
a) Mental health experts from the same adversarial side had good 
agreement about the presence of any mental disorder (ƙ = .74) but only 
fair agreement about a specific diagnosis (ƙ = .31). 
b) Mental health experts on opposite sides had poor agreement about the 
presence of any mental disorder (ƙ = .09) and poor agreement about a 
specific psychiatric diagnosis (ƙ = .14). 
c) Contrary to expectation, awareness of a previous mental health diagnosis 
appears to contribute to lack of agreement of experts, even experts from 
the same side. 
 
The study concludes that error and bias are likely to be present in all forensic 
mental health examinations. Where error and bias are known to be present, it is 
essential to minimize bias wherever possible. A biased evaluation using accurate 
technique is always incorrect. Whereas, an objective assessment using erroneous 
technique may be correct. 
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of agreement about the presence of a psychiatric disorder but fair agreement about a 
specific diagnosis. The findings suggest the presence of both bias45 and error46 and 
suggest even “well-credentialed” psychiatrists and psychologists can reach an 
incorrect diagnosis.47 
Despite skepticism about reliability of evidence of mental disorders and 
frequent diagnostic disagreement, mental health testimony is a common feature in 
criminal cases.  
  
                                                     
45 As to bias, the authors note, 
 
Advocates naturally select experts whose previous opinions are known to support 
a client’s case. Other possible sources include the understandable wish to please 
the hiring party, the financial inducement of the prospect of further work, and the 
nature of the instructions and the selection of documents given to the expert 
witness by the lawyer. The conclusions of medicolegal assessments may also be 
influenced by the interaction between expert and plaintiff.  
 
Id. at 515. 
46 Id. at 520–21. 
47 John T. Philipsborn, Selected Competence Related Rulings: Useful Lessons in 
Approaches to the Analysis of Competence to Stand Trial, CAL. ATT’YS CRIM. JUST. FORUM, 
Sept. 2014, at 31, 37. 
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III.  APPLICATION 
 
A.  Use of Mental Disorder Diagnoses in Criminal Cases 
 
Figure 1. In Criminal Cases, Where Will DSM-5 Make a Difference?
 Mental health testimony is common in the four areas of criminal proceedings 
illustrated above. Implications of the updated diagnostic structure of the DSM-5 vary 
by application. 
In most criminal applications, a diagnosis of mental disorder will not resolve a 
legal question. Evidence of a mental disorder may inform the fact finder of cognitive 
impairment, perceptual problems, behavioral limitations, communication 
difficulties, and sensory dysfunction.48 This information may contribute to 
understanding deficiencies in a defendant’s decisional and performance capabilities. 
But, with a single exception, a diagnosis of mental disorder is not conclusive proof 
of a legal condition. Notably: 
 
                                                     
48 The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence notes that major diagnostic categories 
evidenced in legal proceedings are schizophrenia, dissociative disorder, bipolar disorder, 
major depressive disorder, substance disorders, personality disorders, antisocial personality 
disorder, organic brain disorders, intellectual disability, and dementia. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 831–33 (3d ed. 
2011) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE]. 
Culpability 
Sanity
Compentency:
Trial/Plea/
Execution
Intellectual 
Disability
Mitigation 
Sentencing 
Death Penalty
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 Evidence of mental disease or disorder is a necessary but not sufficient 
element of insanity.49 
 Evidence of mental disease or disorder is not conclusive of incompetency 
to stand trial, enter into a plea agreement, waive counsel, or be executed.50 
 Evidence of mental disease or disorder may be introduced to mitigate 
punishment in criminal sentencing or in death penalty cases,51 but mental 
health evidence does not guarantee a favorable sentencing determination.52 
 Evidence of mental disease or disorder is often presented to support an 
assertion of “future dangerousness”53 in order to justify continued civil 
commitment as a sex offender,54 pedophile,55 or mentally disordered 
offender.56 
 
Intellectual disability, the disorder previously known as mental retardation, is 
the sole mental disorder whose diagnosis resolves a legal dispute. In 2002, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Atkins v. Virginia,57 which categorically banned 
                                                     
49 Definitions of insanity are generally based on the M’Naghten rule, which has a 
cognitive component: whether a mental defect prevents a defendant from understanding what 
he was doing; and it has a moral component: whether, due to a mental defect, a defendant is 
unable to understand that his action was wrong. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747, 750 
(2006). Jurisdictions all incorporate one or both M’Naghten components. Id. at 750–52. 
50 The test for competency to stand trial is whether the defendant “has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). A prisoner is not competent 
to be executed if his mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the 
crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of the community as a 
whole. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958–59 (2007). 
51 A jury must be able to “consider and give effect to [a defendant’s] mitigating 
evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood in rendering its sentencing 
decision.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318 (1989).  
52 See Yan Xuan & Kenneth J. Weiss, Diminished Capacity: Mitigating or Aggravating 
Factor in Sentencing?, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 242, 242–43 (2014). 
53 Psychiatric testimony is admissible to prove future dangerousness. See Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903 (1983). 
54 In Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
prisoner’s confinement may extend past his sentencing date if it can be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he suffers from a mental disorder affecting his emotional or volitional 
capacity, which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses. Id. at 410, 413. 
55 A current controversy with the DSM-5 involves the diagnosis of pedophilic disorder 
and the term pedophilic sexual orientation. Fred S. Berlin, Pedophilia and DSM-5: The 
Importance of Clearly Defining the Nature of a Pedophilic Disorder, 42 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 404, 404 (2014). 
56 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960–2981 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015) (authorizing 
continued commitment for a defendant with a severe mental disorder who is not in remission 
and was responsible for or contributed to a violent criminal act, so long as the defendant is a 
substantial danger of physical harm to others due to his mental disorder). 
57 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
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the death penalty for capital defendants who have intellectual disability.58 The Atkins 
decision created a special class of defendants exempt from the death penalty, with 
inclusion in that class determined by a clinical diagnosis that is essentially made by 
a judge or jury, based largely on evidence from mental health experts. The DSM-5 
revised the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability to be consistent with the 
current definition of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities.59 The DSM-5 definition and diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability 
were cited extensively in Hall v. Florida.60 
 
B.  Mental Disorders in Insanity Cases 
 
Insanity is a legal construct that does not have a one-to-one correspondence 
with any particular psychiatric diagnosis. In most jurisdictions, insanity is defined 
as an inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions or understand the 
nature and quality of the act at the time of a crime due to a mental disease or defect.61 
Though testimony about disorders like schizophrenia or bipolar disorder can educate 
the fact finder about disease process and consequent cognitive and perceptual 
impairment, a diagnosis alone does not prove that a defendant was so impaired at 
the time of the crime to be unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. A 
mere diagnosis is not sufficient to meet the legal requirements of insanity, but a 
mental disorder or defect is a necessary element in an insanity defense.62 
An insanity defense generally involves testimony by mental health 
professionals and may include evidence of prior mental disorders and of family 
history of mental disorders.63 Because insanity describes a defendant’s mental state 
at the time of the offense, evidence of a defendant’s actions leading up to and 
following the event is crucial to a finding of insanity.64 In general, mental health 
                                                     
58 Id. at 318–20.  
59 THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 20, at 12–13. 
60 See, e.g., 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1988, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2009 (2014). 
61 The American Law Institute definition of insanity reads, “A person is not responsible 
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) 
(1985) (alteration in original); cf. infra note 49.  
62 In Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), it was uncontested that the defendant, who 
shot and killed a police officer, suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at 745–46. Lay and 
expert testimony established that the defendant suffered from longstanding paranoid 
delusions, believing that Flagstaff, Arizona, was populated by aliens who wanted to kill him. 
Id. at 745. The defendant believed that the only way to protect himself was to kill the aliens 
with bullets. Id. Expert testimony established that the defendant believed the officer was an 
alien. Id. The prosecution was unable to establish that the defendant knew that the victim 
was a police officer. Id. at 746. However, the court (there was no jury) found that the 
defendant was not so impaired that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions 
and hence he was not insane. Id. 
63 REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 48, at 820–21, 834. 
64 Id. at 817. 
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professionals are barred from testifying about the “ultimate issue”—that is, they may 
not state their opinion as to a defendant’s sanity or insanity at the time of a crime.65 
Despite the fact that the insanity defense dates back at least to the Code of 
Hammurabi,66 the defense is the subject of derision by the prosecutorial community 
and the general public. A common belief, fostered by the media,67 is that a defendant 
who is found not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in some way gets off without 
punishment.68 This belief is categorically untrue. In fact, NGRI defendants often 
spend more time in confinement than similarly charged and convicted persons.69 
Defendants found NGRI are required to undergo psychiatric treatment until they are 
returned to sanity.70 Though a defendant may not be held in a psychiatric institution 
indefinitely without due process,71 a defendant with a history of insanity may be kept 
for life, if he is considered a danger to others.72 The federal courts and all but three 
states—Montana, Idaho and Utah—recognize the NGRI defense. 
The insanity defense is raised in less than 1% of felony cases, and in only one 
in four of those cases is the defense successful.73 Diagnoses of mental disorders—
diagnoses based on the DSM—existed in 90% of all insanity cases.74 It is likely that 
experts’ conflicting diagnoses, based on bias and error, create confusion for fact 
finders in insanity cases, leading to the low success rate of the defense. 
 
                                                     
65 See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an 
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that 
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of 
fact alone.”).  
66 Andrew Garofolo, Early Implications of the Insanity Defense, HIST. FORENSIC 
PSYCHOL., http://historyforensicpsych.umwblogs.org/the-insanity-defense-outline-by-
andrew-garofolo/early-implications-of-the-insanity-defense/, archived at http://perma.cc/2T 
JD-CVWT (last visited Mar. 18, 2015); see also Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and 
Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 724, 734–36 (2004). 
67 Richard A. Pasewark, A Review of Research on the Insanity Defense, ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 1986, at 100, 101–02. 
68 See FAUST, supra note 15, at 535. 
69 See Joseph H. Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative 
Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 403–04 (1983) (finding that “NGRI 
defendants . . . spend considerably more time in custody than do other criminal defendants”). 
70 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1201(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) (“If, upon the trial 
of that question, the jury finds that . . . [the defendant] is sane, judgment shall be pronounced, 
but if they find . . . [the defendant] insane, he or she shall be committed to the state hospital 
for the care and treatment of the insane, until he or she becomes sane . . . .”).  
71 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82–83 (1992). 
72 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
357–58 (1997).  
73 Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: 
An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334–35 (1991).  
74 See id. at 337. 
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C.  Mental Disorders and Culpability Analysis 
 
Diagnoses of mental disorders may be used in establishing that a defendant, 
due to mental impairment or disorder, was unable to form the requisite mental state 
required to prove the crime.75 Diminished capacity may also be considered in 
criminal sentencing. Under federal law, a more lenient sentence may be warranted 
if a defendant committed a crime while suffering from a serious mental illness 
(“SMI”), which significantly reduced the defendant’s mental capacity, and the 
reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the 
offense.76 
The diagnoses included in the category of serious mental illness have long been 
a topic of debate. Does everyone with bipolar disorder have SMI? Does everyone 
with an eating disorder have SMI? Is intellectual disability an SMI? In 1992, the 
U.S. secretary of Health and Human Services developed the federal definition of 
SMI: 
 
“[A]dults with a serious mental illness” are persons: [1] Age 18 and over, 
[2] [w]ho currently or at any time during the past year, [3] [h]ave had a 
diagnosable mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder of sufficient 
duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within [the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders], [4] [t]hat has resulted in 
functional impairment which substantially interferes with or limits one or 
more major life activities. . . . All of these disorders have episodic, 
recurrent, or persistent features; however, they vary in terms of severity 
and disabling effects.77 
                                                     
75 The diminished capacity defense has come under increased scrutiny following the 
notorious cases of People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981), and United States v. Hinckley, 
525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981). In White, the defendant killed San Francisco Supervisor 
Harvey Milk and Mayor George Moscone. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 614. White was convicted 
of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. Id. at 615. White’s “Twinkie Defense” was a 
defense of diminished capacity due to severe depression. See id. As part of that defense, 
White’s defense team offered evidence of White’s excessive junk food consumption to 
establish the mental diagnosis of depression. Paul Krassner, Behind the Twinkie Defense, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2012, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-
krassner/behind-the-twinkie-defense_b_2147393.html, available at http://perma.cc/WC65-
RLYW.  
In Hinckley, the defendant was found NGRI of attempted murder of President Ronald 
Reagan. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. at 1345. After reviewing evidence of increasingly bizarre 
behavior in the months prior to the shooting, the jury concluded that Hinckley’s mental 
disorder prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. at 1348.  
For an extensive discussion on the insanity defense and its shortcomings, see Stephen 
J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: 
Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071 (2007). 
76 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2014).  
77 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 58 Fed. Reg. 29,422, 
29,425 (May 20, 1993) (citations omitted).  
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This broadly inclusive definition of SMI lends itself to interpretation by the fact 
finder, who often creates a hierarchy of “seriousness” of mental illnesses. 
It is noteworthy that evidence of mental disorder does not necessarily lead to a 
lower sentence. For example, in United States v. Lucas,78 the defendant, who was 
charged with assault with a deadly weapon, threats, and kidnapping, argued that he 
had diminished capacity due to Asperger’s syndrome, attention deficit hyperactive 
disorder, and bipolar disorder.79 He claimed that he was in a manic state due to a 
reaction to the psychotropic drug Provigil and that his mental state was 
compromised.80 The plea deal allowed for a sentence within the range of seven years 
to life imprisonment.81 The judge rejected Lucas’s diminished capacity argument.82 
Indeed, the judge identified bad conduct that preceded the Provigil treatment and 
determined that Provigil did not create diminished capacity in the defendant.83 The 
judge then found no mitigation by virtue of diminished capacity and sentenced Lucas 
to 17.5 years.84 
In conclusion, evidence of mental disorders is a critical component of an 
insanity defense. However the presence of a diagnosis, even in conjunction with 
delusional beliefs, may not persuade a fact finder of reduced culpability. 
 
D.  Guilty but Mentally Ill 
 
“Guilty but mentally ill” (“GBMI”) is a legal construct that discards any 
requirement for a judge or jury to determine a defendant’s state of mind at the time 
of the commission of a crime.85 GBMI was first established in Michigan in 1975, 
expressly to reduce the number of NGRI verdicts.86 Now, twenty states have 
attempted to reduce NGRI verdicts by allowing the alternative verdict of GBMI.87 
The stated purpose of this verdict is to reduce the number of successful insanity 
defenses by offering an intermediate verdict between guilty and NGRI.88 
                                                     
78 670 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012). 
79 Id. at 788. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 789. 
83 Id. at 789, 793. 
84 Id. at 789. 
85 See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 75, at 1122. 
86 Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration 
of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and 
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to 
the Insanity Defense, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 37–38 (2005). 
87 Id.  
88 See Scott Leigh Sherman, Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Retreat from the Insanity 
Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 237, 254 (1981). 
862 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
The definition of GBMI varies from state to state. Some states define GBMI as 
“not insane but was suffering from a mental illness.”89 GBMI gives jurors the 
impression that there is an intermediate verdict between guilty and NGRI, and 
provides an avenue to avoid the ethical conflict many feel about the insanity defense. 
Studies show jurors believe that a finding of GBMI in some way diminishes the 
culpability of a defendant90 and gives the illusion of compassionate treatment of a 
criminal defendant. In fact, a defendant who pleads NGRI and is found GBMI often 
receives a harsher sentence than those who are simply found guilty.91 In the majority 
of GBMI verdicts, the defendant receives no psychiatric or mental health 
treatment,92 clearly in violation of Estelle v. Gamble.93 The American Psychiatric 
Association,94 American Psychological Association,95 and American Bar 
Association96 all oppose the GBMI verdict. 
 
E.  Mental Disorders in the Consideration of Competence to Be Executed 
 
In Ford v. Wainwright,97 the U.S. Supreme Court held that executing a person 
who is presently incompetent violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment.98 There, in accordance with Florida law, three state-
appointed psychiatrists interviewed Ford, a condemned inmate.99 But contrary to the 
evidence,100 Ford was found to have the mental capacity to understand the nature of 
                                                     
89 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2(c) (West 2002 & Supp. 2014). 
90 NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW 295–96 
(1995); Norman J. Finkel & Solomon M. Fulero, Insanity: Making Law in the Absence of 
Evidence, 11 MED. & L. 383, 395–97, 400 (1992). 
91 Lisa A. Callahan et al., Measuring the Effects of the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) 
Verdict, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 447, 449 (1992). 
92 See Hanke Gratteau, Little Help for ‘Guilty but Mentally Ill’, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 
1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-04-30/news/8501260304_1_mental-health-
illinois-department-guilty, archived at http://perma.cc/CST3-978K. 
93 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (holding that prisoners have a right to medical care). 
94 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Learn/Archives/Position-2007-
Insanity-Defense.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D3SS-ZH8H. 
95 Council Policy Manual: Chapter XII. Public Interest (Part 1), AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/about/policy/chapter-12.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3GUY 
-AM2F (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
96 See Mental Health, AM. BAR ASS’N, available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_mentalhealth_blk.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7KWJ-BHF7 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (“Statutes which 
supplant or supplement the verdict of not guilty by reason of mental nonresponsibility 
[insanity] with a verdict of guilty but mentally ill should not be enacted.” (alteration in 
original)). 
97 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
98 Id. at 409–10. 
99 Id. at 403–04. 
100 Consider this segment of the transcript of the experts’ interview and report: 
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the death penalty and the reason it was imposed.101 And under Florida law, Ford had 
no opportunity to cross-examine the State’s handpicked experts.102 The U.S. 
Supreme Court was skeptical of the fundamental fairness of the process: 
 
Cross-examination of the psychiatrists, or perhaps a less formal 
equivalent, would contribute markedly to the process of seeking truth in 
sanity disputes by bringing to light the bases for each expert’s beliefs, the 
precise factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error or caprice of 
the examiner, any personal bias with respect to the issue of capital 
punishment, the expert’s degree of certainty about his or her own 
conclusions, and the precise meaning of ambiguous words used in the 
report. Without some questioning of the experts concerning their technical 
conclusions, a factfinder simply cannot be expected to evaluate the various 
opinions, particularly when they are themselves inconsistent.103 
 
                                                     
 
 The guard stands outside my cell and reads my mind. Then he puts it on tape 
and sends it to the Reagans and CBS . . . I know there is some sort of death penalty, 
but I’m free to go whenever I want because it would be illegal and the executioner 
would be executed . . . CBS is trying to do a movie about my case . . . I know the 
KKK and news reporters all disrupting me and CBS knows it. Just call CBS crime 
watch . . . there are all kinds of people in pipe alley (an area behind Mr. Ford’s 
cell) bothering me—Sinatra, Hugh Heffner, people from the dog show, Richard 
Burr, my sisters and brother trying to sign the death warrants so they don’t keep 
bothering me . . . I never see them, I only hear them especially at night. (Note that 
Mr. Ford denies seeing these people in his delusions. This suggests that he is 
honestly reporting what his mental processes are.) I won’t be executed because of 
no crime . . . maybe because I’m a smart ass . . . my family’s back there (in pipe 
alley) . . . you can’t evaluate me. I did a study in the army . . . a lot of masturbation 
. . . I lost a lot of money on the stock market. They’re back there investigating my 
case. Then this guy motions with his finger like when I pulled the trigger. Come 
on back you’ll see what they’re up to—Reagan’s back there too. Me and Gail 
bought the prison and I have to sell it back. State and federal prisons. We changed 
all the other counties and because we’ve got a pretty good group back there I’m 
completely harmless. That’s how Jimmy Hoffa got it. My case is gonna save me. 
 
Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.4, Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (No. 85-5542) (noting that the comments in 
parenthesis are those of Dr. Kaufman). “Dr. Barnard agreed with Dr. Halleck and further 
concluded that Dr. Ivory’s crucial inferential finding, that Mr. Ford was feigning psychosis 
because his cell was far better organized than his thought processes seemed to be . . . had no 
basis in the medical literature.” Id. at 5 (citations omitted). 
101 Ford, 477 U.S. at 404. 
102 Id. at 415 (plurality opinion). 
103 Id.; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983) (stating that there are 
doctors who are willing to testify at sentencing hearings whose opinions are inconsistent with 
each other and the American Psychiatric Association’s views). 
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Ford restated the common law104 and established that a competency assessment 
is subject to due process and Eighth Amendment protection from arbitrary 
punishment.105 However, Ford refrained from defining how the law should 
determine who is presently competent. 
Twenty-one years later, in Panetti v. Quarterman,106 the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of competence to be executed with increased specificity. Texas 
resident, Scott Panetti, had a long history of schizophrenia and involuntary 
commitments for psychiatric treatment.107 He was accused of capital murder for 
killing his in-laws.108 Despite being delusional, the trial court found Panetti 
competent to stand trial and to represent himself.109 Panetti wore a cowboy suit to 
court and attempted to subpoena Jesus Christ, Anne Bancroft, and John F. 
Kennedy.110 Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death.111 In habeas corpus, 
Panetti claimed that he was incompetent to stand trial and incompetent to be 
                                                     
104 Blackstone explained the common law rule as follows:  
 
[I]f a man in his [s]ound memory commits a capital offence, and before 
arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; becau[s]e 
he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after 
he has pleaded, the pri[s]oner becomes mad, he [s]hall not be tried; for how can 
he make his defence? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he lo[s]es his [s]en[s]es 
before judgment, judgment [s]hall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he 
becomes of non[s]ane memory, execution [s]hall be [s]tayed: for peradventure, 
[s]ays the humanity of the Engli[s]h law, had the pri[s]oner been of [s]ound 
memory, he might have alleged [s]omething in [s]tay of judgment or execution. 
  
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24–25 (citations omitted). 
105 Ford, 477 U.S. at 409–10; id. at 413–14 (plurality opinion). 
106 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
107 Id. at 936. For a recitation of Panetti’s history of mental disorders presented in his 
state court post-conviction proceedings, see Brief for Respondent at 3–10, Panetti, 551 U.S. 
930 (No. 06-6407), 2007 WL 978432, at *3–10.  
108 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 935–36. 
109 Id. at 936.  
110 Ex parte Panetti, 326 S.W.3d 615, 617–18 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (per curiam) 
(“Scott dressed in a ‘Tom Mix’ style costume like an old TV western. Scott wore his hat in 
Court. He had pants that looked like leather suede tucked into his cowboy boots. He wore a 
cowboy style shirt with a bandana. The shirt was the double fold over type western shirt. One 
shirt was a green color, the other was burgundy. Scott wore a big cowboy hat that hung on a 
string over his back. It was a joke. It was like out of a dime store novel. Scott constantly used 
an old west vernacular in his speech. He used words like ‘bronc steer,’ ‘run away mule,’ and 
‘shoe the bosses’ hosses.’” (quoting Panetti’s standy counsel’s affidavit filed at trial)); Chase 
Hoffberger, Death Watch: Executing the Mentally (and Physically) Ill, AUSTIN CHRON. 
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2014-11-28/deathwatch-executing-
the-mentally-and-physically-ill/, archived at http://perma.cc/86CV-KZRZ.  
111 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 937.  
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executed.112 The trial courts disagreed.113 After lengthy habeas corpus proceedings, 
the Court ruled that, to be executed, Panetti was required to have a “rational 
understanding” of the death sentence and why it was imposed, among other 
factors.114 “Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an 
awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed 
from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.”115 Panetti was 
granted the opportunity for a competency evaluation.116 Though he was profoundly 
psychotic, the trial court found that he was competent to be executed but his sentence 
was stayed pending further proceedings.117 In 2013, the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s finding of competency to be executed.118 His attorneys filed a petition 
for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court denied.119 But 
his request for a stay of execution pending further proceedings has been granted.120 
Despite predictions to the contrary, relatively few death-sentenced inmates 
assert that they are not competent to be executed. In some successful cases, evidence 
suggests that where a rightful claim of incompetence to stand trial was asserted and 
denied, it is likely that the defendant was incompetent for all purposes.121 Most 
successful claims of incompetence for execution follow on the heels of prior claims 
of incompetence.122 It is estimated that between 5 and 10% of death row inmates 
suffer from serious mental illness but only 6.7% have filed claims of protection from 
execution due to incompetency.123 
Despite diagnoses of profound mental illness, there are many stories of 
condemned inmates who seem to fit the Panetti framework of incompetence.124 The 
majority of these inmates suffer from schizophrenic spectrum and other psychotic 
                                                     
112 Id. at 937–38. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 958–60. 
115 Id. at 960. 
116 Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 26, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 47 (2014). 
117 Id. at *37.  
118 Panetti, 727 F.3d at 410–13. 
119 Panetti, 135 S. Ct. at 47. 
120 Panetti v. Stephens, 586 F. App’x 163, 164 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
121 See John H. Blume et al., Killing the Oblivious: An Empirical Study of Competency 
to Be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 335, 356–57 (2014). 
122 Id. at 356. 
123 Id. at 354. 
124 E.g., Marc Bookman, 13 Men Condemned to Die Despite Severe Mental Illness, 
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 12, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/ 
death-penalty-cases-mental-illness-clemency, archived at http://perma.cc/87VJ-6ZFA.  
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disorders,125 as well as bipolar disorder.126 However, these diagnoses are not 
guaranteed to stop their executions. Table 2 provides examples of those who were 
likely incompetent for execution.127 
 
Table 2.  Inmates Sentenced for Execution Likely Incompetent 
 
Inmate State Crime 
Date 
Diagnosis Psychiatric 
Symptoms 
Status 
Johnny 
Frank 
Garrett 
Texas 1981 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Lethal injection 
would not kill 
him. Supernatural 
intervention by a 
long-dead aunt 
would counteract 
the lethal 
chemicals. 
Executed 
in 1992 
Larry 
Keith 
Robison 
Texas 1982 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Auditory 
hallucinations 
told him that he 
was a part of the 
apocalypse and 
his death would 
liberate many 
souls so that he 
could be 
liberated. 
Executed 
in 2000 
Monty 
Allen 
Delk 
Texas 1986 Bipolar 
disorder 
He was the 
president of 
Kenya and a 
submarine 
commander. Last 
words: “I am the 
warden. Get your 
warden off this 
gurney. You are 
not in America. 
This is the island 
of Barbados.” 
Executed 
in 2002 
                                                     
125 Id. Schizophrenia Spectrum and other psychotic disorders are thought disorders, 
which may involve delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking and disorganized motor 
behaviors. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 87. 
126 Bookman, supra note 124. Bipolar disorder has symptoms that may overlap with 
those of both schizophrenia spectrum disorders and depressive disorders. AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 123. 
127 Bookman, supra note 124. 
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Inmate State Crime 
Date 
Diagnosis Psychiatric 
Symptoms 
Status 
James 
Blake 
Colburn 
Texas 1994 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
So drugged at 
trial that he 
snored through 
the trial. When 
not medicated he 
ate his own feces. 
Executed 
in 2003 
Kelsey 
Patterson 
Texas 1992 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
He was controlled 
by an electronic 
implant. Parole 
board 
recommended 
sentence 
commutation 
based on mental 
illness. 
Executed 
in 2004 
Steven 
Staley 
Texas 1989 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Had grandiose 
and paranoid 
delusions. He 
invented the first 
car. Smears feces 
in his cell. 
Involuntarily 
medicated. 
Execution 
pending 
Guy 
Tobis 
LeGrande 
North 
Carolina 
1993 Delusional 
disorder 
Believed he could 
communicate 
with Oprah 
through the TV. 
Represented 
himself at trial 
wearing a 
Superman T-shirt. 
Called the jurors 
“Antichrists”. 
Found not 
competent 
to be 
executed 
George 
Emil 
Banks 
Pennsylvania 1982 Psychotic 
disorder 
Believed the 
government was 
trying to poison 
him. His death 
sentences had 
been vacated by 
God, Jesus, and 
G.W.Bush. 
On death 
row 
Calvin 
Eugene 
Swann 
Virginia 1992  Talked to animals 
and spoke in 
numbers. 
Institutionalized 
from childhood. 
Behavior on 
Sentence 
commuted 
in 1999 
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Inmate State Crime 
Date 
Diagnosis Psychiatric 
Symptoms 
Status 
death row was 
“bizarre and 
devoid of 
rationality.” 
Alexander 
E. 
Williams 
Georgia 1986 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Saw little men in 
his cell, talked to 
animals, and 
thought 
Sigourney 
Weaver was God. 
Sentence 
commuted 
in 2002; 
hung 
himself 
later 
Arthur 
Paul 
Baird 
Indiana 1985  Claimed to have 
solved the 
nation’s debt and 
was owed $1 
million reward 
from the 
government. God 
would turn back 
time and bring his 
victims back. 
Sentence 
commuted 
in 2005 
Percy 
Levar 
Walton 
Virginia 1996 Schizophrenia He was 
Superman, Jesus 
and the Bible was 
written about 
him. Execution 
would bring him 
and his victims 
back to life. 
Sentence 
commuted 
in 2008 
 
F.  Mental Disorders in the Context of Competence to Stand Trial, Enter a Plea, 
and Waive Counsel 
 
Competency to stand trial requires that a defendant have both a rational 
understanding of the legal proceedings against him and an ability to communicate 
effectively with his attorney.128 A defendant must have “sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and have 
“a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”129 In 
practice, the ability to effectively participate in one’s defense is crux of competence. 
For example, in Dusky v. United States,130 the petitioner was referred for 
evaluation by his attorney.131 The state psychiatric facility found him psychotic with 
                                                     
128 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960) (per curiam). 
129 Id. at 402 (quoting the Solicitor General’s statements in the record).  
130 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959). 
131 Id. at 387. 
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auditory and visual hallucinations and diagnosed him with schizophrenia.132 Despite 
uncontested evidence that he was unable to assist trial counsel, Dusky was found 
competent, tried, and convicted.133 
One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the value of psychiatric 
evidence of competence to stand trial but agreed that the record deserved further 
review:  
 
In view of the doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal significance 
of the psychiatric testimony in this case and the resulting difficulties of 
retrospectively determining the petitioner’s competency as of more than a 
year ago, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the 
judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the District Court for a 
new hearing to ascertain petitioner’s present competency to stand trial, and 
for a new trial if petitioner is found competent.134 
 
In addition, from 1996 to 1998, the National Institute of Mental Health in 
conjunction with the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation investigated 
adult competence to stand trial. One outcome was the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA).135 The study determined: 
 
 Approximately 10 percent of all criminal defendants are perceived by 
their attorneys as having potentially impaired competence. . . . 
[D]efendants of doubtful competence are usually not referred by their 
attorneys for a formal mental health evaluation.  
 A defendant may need several different capacities to be competent to 
proceed with criminal adjudication . . . . It is not sufficient to assess 
only one capacity to evaluate adjudicative competence: a defendant 
with mental disorder may not have an impairment on the assessed 
capacity, even though other capacities required for adjudicative 
competence are impaired.  
 A person whose competence is impaired for one legal purpose . . . 
does not necessarily lack competence for other legal purposes (e.g., 
adjudicating his or her criminal case). Conversely, a person who is 
competent for one legal purpose may have impairments in 
competence for other legal purposes.  
 While no clinical diagnosis by itself indicates incompetence, 
competence-related impairments regarding criminal adjudication are 
                                                     
132 Id. at 387–89. 
133 Id. at 386–87, 389. 
134 Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403. 
135 The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study, MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON 
MENTAL HEALTH & L., http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/adjudicate.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HUY7-L7V3 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
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strongly associated with symptoms of severe mental disorder, and 
particularly with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. . . . 
 When defendants hospitalized for restoration of competence were 
retested with [the MacCAT-CA], significant improvement in 
decision making abilities was observed for those defendants who 
were treated and referred back to court as having been restored to 
competence. . . . 
 Empirical information is now available to inform judges and 
legislators as they set [legal] standards [for competence].136 
 
“For clinical information to be relevant in addressing legal questions of 
competence, examiners must present the logic that links these observations to the 
specific abilities and capacities with which the law is concerned.”137 Though 
standardized measurements of competence suggest an objective assessment, there is 
still a prevalence of the attitude that “I’ll know it when I see it”138 in a determination 
of competence to stand trial. Competence to enter a plea is held to the same standard 
as competency to stand trial.139 
In setting a standard of competence to stand trial, the Court has focused directly 
upon a defendant’s ability to consult with his lawyer.140 Dusky suggests that 
choosing to forgo trial counsel presents a different set of circumstances than the 
mental competency determination for a defendant to stand trial.141  
Indiana v. Edwards142 recognized that the nature of a defendant’s mental illness 
may “vary over time” and interfere with a defendant’s “functioning at different times 
in different ways.”143 Edwards cautions against the use of a single competency 
standard to decide “both whether a defendant who is represented can proceed to trial 
and whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself.”144 
Finally, competency to stand trial, particularly in death penalty cases, is a 
frequent subject of litigation in habeas corpus. Dusky, Panetti, and Edwards 
demonstrate that the prospect of successful retrospective assessment of competency 
is dim.  
 
                                                     
136 Id. 
137 THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS 13 (2d ed. 2003). 
138 See JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE 
AND TESTIMONY 61–62, 297 (2009) (stating that there are still a number of judges who apply 
competence measurements subjectively on a case-by-case basis).  
139 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993). 
140 “[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . .” Dusky v. United States, 362 
U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (quoting the Solicitor General’s statements in the record).  
141 See id. at 402–03. 
142 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
143 Id. at 175. 
144 Id. at 165. 
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G.  Mental Disorders in the Context of Death Penalty Mitigation 
 
The death penalty is limited to offenders who commit the most serious crimes, 
“whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”145 
Sentencing decisions in capital cases are supposed to be based on individualized 
considerations of the offender and the crime.146 Jurors are required to consider 
circumstances that make a death sentence more appropriate (aggravating factors) 
and circumstances that make a life sentence more appropriate (mitigating factors).147 
Mitigating factors can include “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.”148 Mitigating factors involving mental health experts 
include mental illness, intellectual impairments, family mental health history, and 
childhood trauma.149 Aggravating factors are defined by statute150 and, in some 
states, there are so many statutory aggravating factors that most murders would 
qualify for the death penalty.151  
                                                     
145 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 568 (2005)). 
146 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
147 Id. at 196–97. 
148 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). For example, the 
Model Penal Code mitigating factors cited in Gregg include the following: 
 
The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. . . . The murder 
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance. . . . The victim was a participant in the defendant’s 
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act. . . . The murder was 
committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to provide a moral 
justification or extenuation for his conduct. . . . The defendant was an accomplice 
in a murder committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal 
act was relatively minor. . . . The defendant acted under duress or under the 
domination of another person. . . . At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental 
disease or defect or intoxication. . . . The youth of the defendant at the time of the 
crime. 
 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193–94 n.44 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
149 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE 
SHAME OF STATES 30–31 (2013) (listing the four-part test created from Gregg by Professor 
James Liebman); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193–94 n.44 (plurality opinion) (noting the 
Model Penal Code mitigating factors that may be considered in death penalty sentencing). 
150 For a list of aggravating factors, see Aggravating Factors for Capital Punishment 
by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/aggravating-
factors-capital-punishment-state, archived at http://www.perma.cc/SB27-SS7X (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015). 
151 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2014 & Supp. 2015) (listing twenty-two 
different circumstances that make a crime suitable for the death penalty). 
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Perhaps more so than in most other criminal proceedings, evidence of mental 
illness is a major component of mitigation.152 This is not to say that evidence of 
mental illness is determinative of a sentence of life imprisonment. Of the last one 
hundred offenders executed before June 2014, evidence showed that fifty-four “had 
been diagnosed with or displayed symptoms of severe mental illness.”153 Among 
those, “six . . . were diagnosed with schizophrenia, three with bipolar disorder, and 
nine with post-traumatic stress disorder.”154 Six had attempted suicide.155 And the 
most prevalent mental illness was chronic drug addiction.156 The evidence 
demonstrated that their mental illnesses impaired their “ability to think clearly, 
manage emotions, make decisions, [and] relate to others, and cause[d] unpredictable 
and disorganized behavior.”157 
Evidence of mental disorder or impairment is used both as a sword and a shield 
in capital cases.158 Studies demonstrate that two substantive issues are the primary 
subjects of mental health testimony in capital sentencing.159 First, evidence of mental 
illness or impairment is offered to reduce the defendant’s culpability to the degree 
that execution would not be appropriate—that is, to show that the defendant is not 
“the worst of the worst.”160 In rebuttal, the State offers evidence of the likelihood 
that a defendant will continue to be dangerous—“future dangerousness”—to 
persuade the jury that execution is justified.161 Note that future dangerousness has 
been shown to play a prominent role in jury deliberations, even to the extent that it 
may overshadow mitigating evidence.162 
                                                     
152 PERLIN, supra note 149, at 30 (“The importance of mitigating evidence at the penalty 
stage ‘cannot be overestimated’.” (quoting Welsh S. White, Capital Punishment’s Future, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (1992))). 
153 Robert J. Smith et al., The Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 1221, 1241–
1245 (2014). 
154 Id. at 1245 (citations omitted). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (citation omitted). 
158 PERLIN, supra note 149, at 33 (“[M]itigating evidence is any evidence that the jury 
could reasonably find warrants a sentence less than death.”). 
159 See John H. Montgomery et al., Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror 
Responses, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 509, 510 (2005). 
160 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited 
to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose 
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))). 
161 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983). Future dangerousness is arguably 
inadmissible due to irrelevance. Predictions of future dangerousness are, by nature, purely 
speculative, and rarely correct. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, noted that in the prediction 
of future dangerousness “such testimony is wrong two times out of three.” Id. at 916 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
162 See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always “At 
Issue”, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 404 (2001). 
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Professor John H. Montgomery and his colleagues studied the influence of 
prosecution and defense mental health experts on jurors’ assessment of a defendant’s 
dangerousness, mental stability or craziness, severity of a crime, and remorse—
significant aggravating or mitigating issues where mental health evidence was likely 
to be influential.163 The results of this study were surprising: 
 
 “Psychiatric expert testimony presented by the prosecution during penalty 
phases did not significantly correlate with jurors’ impressions of a 
defendant’s future dangerousness . . . .”164 
 “Psychiatric expert testimony presented by the defense during the penalty 
phases significantly and positively correlated with jurors’ impressions of 
a defendant’s mental abnormality . . . .”165 
 A “defendant’s perceived dangerousness, craziness, and instability on 
average were less when neither state nor defense psychiatric testimony 
was presented.”166 
 A defendant’s perceived lack of remorse correlated significantly with a 
finding of future dangerousness.167 
 Defense psychiatric testimony positively influenced a juror’s assessment 
of craziness (i.e., defendant “went crazy when he committed the crime”). 
State psychiatric testimony had little influence when defense psychiatric 
testimony was presented on the issue of craziness.168 
 Defense psychiatric testimony positively influenced a juror’s assessment 
of mental instability, (i.e., “defendant is mentally unstable or disturbed”). 
State psychiatric testimony had little influence when defense psychiatric 
testimony was presented on the issue of craziness.169 
 
Though testimony from mental health experts may suggest a variety of 
diagnoses, no single diagnosis has been proven to correlate one to one with a finding 
of future dangerousness.  
However, the artificial and unscientific characterization of a defendant as a 
“psychopath” is strongly correlated with a juror’s belief that a defendant is likely to 
be violent in the future.170 Psychopathy is not a diagnosis in the DSM. But the 
behaviors associated with psychopathy are most closely aligned with the DSM-5 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder (301.7).171 
                                                     
163 Montgomery et al., supra note 159, at 516. 
164 Id. at 512. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 513. 
167 Id. at 514. 
168 Id. at 515–16. 
169 Id. at 515. 
170 John F. Edens et al., Effects of Psychopathy and Violence Risk Testimony on Mock 
Juror Perceptions of Dangerousness in a Capital Murder Trial, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 
393, 397 (2004). 
171 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 659. 
874 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
Psychopathy is typically determined by comparing a defendant’s history with 
the two-factor model of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). In its latest revision, 
the PCL-R, a defendant is assessed for certain interpersonal and affective 
characteristics, and for lifestyle and antisocial characteristics.172 It is suggested that 
the results of the assessment correlate with characteristics of antisocial personality 
disorder, such as impulsivity, aggression, and criminal behavior; lack of empathy; 
lack of remorse; deceitfulness; and failure to accept responsibility.173 
There is considerable debate about the construct of psychopathy.174 In 
questioning the conceptual validity of the usefulness of psychopathy for forensic 
purposes, Professor Don Fowles of the University of Iowa notes:  
 
It is not impossible that there is some value in making diagnoses of 
psychopathy in a forensic context, but this review should give everyone 
pause until research has actually established the validity of such 
applications. If in fact the construct of psychopathy does not have 
important predictive value, it is morally dubious to make important 
decisions on the basis of the diagnosis.175 
 
The PCL-R may be administered in person or based solely on records. The 
measurements are largely subjective. And there is no established empirical 
association between psychopathy and violence in a prison environment.176 Despite 
the unreliability of this evidence, few courts find it inadmissible.177 
Diagnoses of mental disorders as defined in the DSM-5 have an unquantifiable 
influence in the context of capital case mitigation.178 When a mental health expert is 
free to make a diagnosis of psychopath, jurors seem to accept as proven the 
aggravating factor of future dangerousness.179 Professor Marla Sandys and 
colleagues determined that “mere perceptions” of future dangerousness are enough 
to tilt the balance in the direction of a death sentence.180 
                                                     
172 Robert D. Hare & Craig S. Neumann, Psychopathy: Assessment and Forensic 
Implications, 54 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 791, 791–92 (2009). 
173 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 659. Note that the PCL-R method 
of observing and rating behavior to justify a diagnosis deserves the same criticism that Dr. 
Thomas Insel, former Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, noted in his blog. 
See Insel, supra note 1. 
174 See Don C. Fowles, Commentary, Current Scientific Views of Psychopathy, 12 
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 93, 93 (2011) (discussing the radically different traditional and 
contemporary approaches to psychopathy). 
175 Id. at 94. 
176 Edens et al., supra note 170, at 394–95. 
177 See id. Note that in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an individual had a 
“psychopathic personality” that justified deportation because he was homosexual. Boutilier 
v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967). 
178 PERLIN, supra note 149, at 30–31. 
179 Edens et al., supra note 170, at 403. 
180 Marla Sandys et al., Aggravation and Mitigation: Findings and Implications, 37 J. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 189, 189 (2009).  
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IV.  INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY—WHERE THE DSM-5 WILL MAKE A 
DIFFERENCE! 
 
Unlike sanity, competency, or mitigation, a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability181 is both a necessary and sufficient condition to invoke the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.182 A diagnosis of intellectual 
disability is not exclusive of any other diagnosis, and comorbidity of other mental 
disorders is seen three to four times more often in those with intellectual disability 
than in the general population.183 
In its 2002 decision, Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court defined 
intellectual disability verbatim by reference to the language of the then-current 
Fourth Edition of the DMS, the DSM-IV-TR, which required an IQ of seventy or 
below with concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning which are skills of everyday 
living.184 There were few diagnostic details or examples in the DSM-IV-TR of 
deficits in functioning.185 As a result, the translation of the DSM-IV-TR’s clinical 
requirements for diagnosis of intellectual disability to the legal standards for a legal 
determination of intellectual disability has been the subject of hundreds of capital 
proceedings.186 
                                                     
181 “Intellectual Disability . . . is a disorder with onset during the developmental period 
that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and 
practical domains.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33. 
182 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992–93 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 318–21 (2002). 
183 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 37, 40. 
184 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. 
 
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant 
limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of 
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, 
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years 
(Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen 
as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the 
functioning of the central nervous system. 
 
Id. (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR]). 
“‘Mild’ mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50–55 to 
approximately 70.” Id. (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 42–43). 
185 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 184, at 41–49. The description of mental retardation in 
the DSM-IV-TR offered very little practical examples or diagnostic criteria and instead relied 
almost exclusively on IQ scores to define various degrees of severity of mental retardation. 
See id. 
186 Note that since Atkins in 2002, diagnostic practices for the assessment of intellectual 
disability have evolved. The current standards for competent assessment have incorporated 
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Intellectual disability has long been understood to be the result of a large 
number of possible causes of abnormal brain development, including fetal alcohol 
exposure, chromosomal abnormalities, infections during pregnancy, accidents at 
birth, or postnatal trauma.187 Current science recognizes that in most cases of 
intellectual disability that have a biological cause, the affected person’s IQ score 
falls in the range of fifty to seventy or seventy-five; however, cases exist where a 
person’s IQ exceeds seventy-five but their daily functioning is at a level far below 
normal.188 
The DSM-5 reflects the current understanding of intellectual disability and 
provides diagnostic guidance that incorporates current clinical practice and 
experience in the diagnosis of intellectual disability. According to the DSM-5, a 
defendant or petitioner must, at a minimum, present evidence of the following three 
criteria to justify a legal finding of intellectual disability:189 
 
A. Deficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem solving, 
planning, abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and 
learning from experience, confirmed by both clinical assessment and 
individualized, standardized intelligence testing. 
B. Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet 
developmental and sociocultural standards for personal independence 
and social responsibility. Without ongoing support, the adaptive 
deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life, such 
as communication, social participation, and independent living, 
across multiple environments, such as home, school, work, and 
community. 
C. Onset of intellectual and adaptive deficits during the developmental 
period.190 
 
                                                     
scientific research and techniques agreed upon by the American Association on Intellectual 
and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) and the American Psychiatric Association. AM. 
ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: 
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 35–40 (11th ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra 
note 3, at 37–38.  
187 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 38–39 (suggesting that birth 
defects are increased risk factors for developing intellectual disability). 
188 Nancy Haydt et al., Advantages of DSM-5 in the Diagnosis of Intellectual Disability: 
Reduced Reliance on IQ Ceilings in Atkins (Death Penalty) Cases, 82 UMKC L. REV. 359, 
365–72 (2014). 
189 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the DSM as “one of the basic texts used by 
psychiatrists and other experts,” and cites the DSM-5 by name thirteen times. Hall v. Florida, 
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990–2009 (2014). The analysis in Hall directly tracks the language of the 
DSM-5. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33–41. 
190 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33.  
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The DSM-5 adopted the perspective of the American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD).191 According to the AAIDD: 
“[Intelligence] is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill or test-taking 
smarts. Rather it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our 
surroundings—catching on, making sense of things, or figuring out what to do.”192 
Accordingly, “[t]he various levels of severity [of intellectual disability] are defined 
on the basis of adaptive functioning, and not IQ scores, because it is adaptive 
functioning that determines the level of supports required. Moreover, IQ measures 
are less valid in the lower end of the IQ range.”193 
This marks a diagnostic change away from the DSM-IV-TR’s focus on IQ, and 
recognizes that adaptive functioning is a more comprehensive measure of the 
severity of intellectual disability. 
The DSM-5 incorporated important psychometric guidelines for the 
measurement of IQ for purposes of intellectual disability assessment. For example, 
the DSM-5 specifies that intellectual functioning must be measured with an 
individually administered, psychometrically valid and current intelligence test that 
is normed on the general population.194 IQ measurements must take into account a 
test’s standard error of measurement of ± five points.195 It recognizes that out-of-
date test scores may be inflated due to aging test norms (known as the “Flynn 
Effect”).196 The DSM-5 also acknowledges that a cognitive profile based on 
comprehensive neuropsychological testing may be more accurate than a profile 
based solely on a single IQ test.197 
The DSM-5 directs that adaptive functioning should be assessed using 
standardized testing as well as clinical evaluation,198 and advises that educational, 
developmental, medical, and mental health evaluations are additional sources of 
                                                     
191 The AAIDD was formerly known as the American Association on Mental 
Retardation (AAMR) and is the leading professional organization for study, assessment, 
care, and treatment of those with intellectual disability. The DSM-IV definition of mental 
retardation was derived from the AAMR’s definition in AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL 
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF 
SUPPORTS 5–7 (9th ed. 1992). The DSM-5 has incorporated the language of the most recent 
AAIDD publication, AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 186, at 1, 6–7. For a 
comparison of the AAMR and American Psychiatric Association’s historical definitions of 
mental retardation, see id. at 8–9. 
192 AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 186, at 15 (quoting Linda S. 
Gottfredson, Editorial, Mainstream Science on Intelligence: An Editorial with 52 
Signatories, History, and Bibliography, 24 INTELLIGENCE 13, 13 (1997), available at 
http://www.udel.edu/educ/gottfredson/reprints/1997mainstream.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U8XY-55BH.  
193 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33. 
194 Id. at 37. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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evidence of intellectual disability.199 Also, the DSM-5 warns that adaptive 
functioning in controlled environments, such as prisons and jails, may not provide a 
realistic perspective of a person’s adaptive limitations in the community.200 
The changes in the DSM-5 definition of intellectual disability were put to the 
test in Hall v. Florida.201 The petitioner in Hall challenged the Florida Supreme 
Court’s rule that an IQ above seventy automatically disqualified a defendant or 
petitioner from asserting a claim of protection from execution due to intellectual 
disability.202 This rule was used to bar admission of any further evidence, 
particularly evidence of adaptive functioning, in determination of the existence of 
intellectual disability.203 
The Hall opinion adopted the definition of intellectual disability directly from 
the DSM-5 and accepted the DSM-5’s recognition of the inherent imprecision in any 
intelligence test measurement: 
 
For purposes of most IQ tests, the [standard error of measurement] (SEM) 
means that an individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on 
either side of the recorded score. The SEM allows clinicians to calculate a 
range within which one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies.204 
 
The Court adopted the current professional model of intellectual disability, which 
recognizes adaptive functioning as a critical measure in any assessment of 
intellectual disability.205 As Justice Kennedy wisely noted, “Intellectual disability is 
a condition, not a number.”206 
The DSM-5 will have a significant effect in the assessment of intellectual 
disability for capital defendants in the following ways: 
 
 Defendants with IQ scores in the range of seventy-one to seventy-five will 
not be automatically disqualified from a legal determination of intellectual 
disability.207 
 The age of an IQ test is a significant consideration in the calculation of IQ 
score.208 
 Any assessment of intellectual disability must consider standard error of 
measurement.209 
                                                     
199 Id.  
200 Id. at 38. 
201 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990–91 (2014). 
202 Id. at 1991–92. 
203 Id. at 1996. 
204 Id. at 1995. 
205 Id. at 1994. 
206 Id. at 2001. 
207 See DSM-5, supra note 3, at 37. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
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 Recognition that limitations in adaptive functioning are critical to an 
assessment of intellectual disability.210 
 Recognition that records from infancy, childhood, and adolescence are 
valuable sources of evidence of adaptive functioning.211 
 
Following the DSM-5 and Hall, Professor Edward A. Polloway published The 
Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability,212 which is an authoritative resource on 
the science that provides the basis for the definition of intellectual disability and on 
the critical issues involved in its diagnosis. The DSM-5, in conjunction with The 
Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, should improve the diagnostic process of 
determining which capital defendants have intellectual disability and should be 
protected from execution. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, will become a permanent fixture in criminal 
proceedings until the Sixth Edition supersedes it. 
Changes in diagnostic classifications between the DSM-IV-TR and the DSM-
5 are not likely to have a major effect on competency, sanity, or culpability 
assessments. The DSM-5 is likely to interject confusion among attorneys and the 
judiciary in sentencing and capital case proceedings. But it is unlikely that the DSM-
5 will introduce significant changes to proceedings in these matters. 
The DSM-5 should affect intellectual disability cases significantly by 
expanding the definition and understanding of, and the diagnostic procedures for, 
the legal determination of intellectual disability. 
                                                     
210 See id. at 33. 
211 See id. at 38–39. 
212 Polloway, supra note 20, at 4–5, 11–15. 
